


Preparing for the Unthinkable

A Report to the Arizona Judicial Council



December 2003

**Arizona Supreme Court
Report and Recommendations
Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness**

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2/27/04

Introduction

Throughout Arizona's history, the Arizona court system has been fortunate to avoid significant disruption to its operations. However, the fires of the past several summers brought home the notion that courts are not exempt from disruption or tragedy. The events of the Rodeo-Chediski fire have taught us important lessons about what happens when large rural areas and towns are evacuated, courts are closed and court business is disrupted. It is important to take advantage of our experiences managing through those emergencies and use those experiences as a basis to plan for the next emergency.

To that end, Chief Justice Charles Jones issued *Administrative Order 2003-21* naming a committee to take up the challenge of developing an emergency plan for the courts. The purpose of the committee is to develop a plan that can be implemented in the event of a disaster that results in evacuation, serious disruption to the courts or court closures. Justice Jones' expectation is to develop a flexible general plan that addresses the roles and responsibilities of local courts and their probation departments, the Administrative Office of the Courts and executive branch agencies. The plan must address the issues that emerged from the Navajo County experience last year.

Members of the work group constituted a multidisciplinary team from both the executive and judicial branches of government. The committee met and separated into two working subcommittees: a committee to address emergency preparedness and a second committee to address court security issues. Members of each committee labored together for many weeks to propose ideas that will aid judges in protecting the court's property and human resource. The results of the committees' efforts are outlined in this document and are not intended to represent requirements from the Supreme Court to its local courts. The guidelines presented are not mandates; rather, they are goals to which the courts should aspire to ensure safe access for all. The committee believes that our courts, as is our society, are divergent, different and unique. We offer these guidelines as suggestions for consideration by administrative judges whose tasks are many and whose work is often complex and overwhelming in the oversight of their courts.

Key to success in preparing for emergencies is the idea that there are many who will support courts and help them if asked. Communication and cooperation are the two overriding elements for the success of any emergency plan. We cannot emphasize this notion enough.

We, the committee, believe that the challenge Chief Justice Jones has asked us to examine is not finished, but in fact, has just begun. Preparing for threats and emergencies is an ongoing and living requirement that must be shepherded and nurtured far beyond the work of this committee. We hope that our work will be the foundation that allows for successful emergency planning which will save lives and protect property.

Executive Summary

The executive summary consists of a number of recommendations proposed by the committee. These recommendations include:

- Establish a Supreme Court Administrative Order for courts mandating the development of court emergency preparedness and business continuity plans. Plans are to be developed by local courts, in coordination with emergency services and other governmental entities, for submission to the Presiding Judge of each county with annual updates due for submission thereafter.
- The presiding judge shall certify the Court's Emergency Preparedness Plan that addresses at a minimum, emergency evacuation procedures, communication protocols, disaster recovery, business continuity and governance of shared government facilities. The Court Emergency Preparedness plan shall also:
 1. Delineate procedures to be followed and agencies and individuals responsible for responding to disaster situations affecting court operations,
 2. Specify an evacuation procedure for each court facility that would require an unannounced test/drill during business hours.
 3. Require all court employees to rehearse and understand their personal evacuation route for any court facility to which they may be assigned.
 4. Specify how to manage special populations under the supervision, direction or control of the court during an emergency
- The presiding judge of each court shall identify and establish a Critical Incident Response Team that would convene during times of emergency situations or impending emergencies.
- Each court shall establish a standing committee to develop risk assessments, implement contingency plans to maintain essential court operations and conduct periodic emergency drills and audits.
- Each court shall have its own multi-agency emergency planning committee or be a participant in an existing local, city or county level emergency planning committee
- Establish mandatory COJET training programs for judges and other court personnel specific to courthouse security and emergency preparedness.
- Continue the work of this committee as a standing committee to establish administrative codes governing hiring and training standards for court security personnel and develop court security audit protocols.

Emergency Preparedness

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order #2003-21, Chief Justice Jones established a Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness. The Committee was charged with identifying areas of concern and recommending best security practices, policies and procedures that can be adopted by the Arizona Judicial Council and by the courts in the Arizona court system. These “best practices” would ensure that court staff, litigants, jurors, and other court users are provided safe, functional, dignified and accessible court facilities. The Committee would also develop recommendations and guidelines for emergency preparedness and contingency planning for the courts. The Committee’s work would be carried out in a manner that recognizes geographic and size differences between courts and recognizes that any plans and recommendations must be achievable with resources or support that exists or are likely to be made available.

In its work, the Committee recognized that emergencies, disasters and accidents affecting the courts can occur at any time, usually without warning. Whether human-caused, or acts of nature, the result is a critical incident that must be recognized and dealt with promptly and rationally.

Presiding Judges should take the lead to assure that necessary preparations are made so that if a critical incident occurs, the judicial branch will be able to maintain constitutionally mandated operations of the justice system.

Being prepared for critical incidents, both individually and organizationally is a responsibility of all judicial officers and court staff. Planning and preparing for critical incidents in the courts can be time-consuming, however, the experiences of other courts that have encountered such incidents have shown that a few simple preparations can significantly enhance the ability of court staff to manage through them. At minimum, those preparations should include:


- A designated emergency chain-of-command,
- A designated emergency response team,
- A communication system for the response team and a location to bring them together,
- A plan for alternative facilities for court operations,
- A process for identifying critical court operations and the minimum time to return them to operation.

With this preparation, the emergency response team can meet, communicate and manage the critical incident.

BENEFITS OF DISASTER PLANNING:

In developing business continuity plans, judges and court managers must work closely with local government officials, police, fire and other emergency services. This coordination can be achieved through court participation (Superior or Limited Jurisdiction Presiding Judge or designees), at the local level, in existing county or city emergency planning committees, and/or establishing a court-based planning committee, with multi-agency composition. The committee may be comprised of the Superior Court or Limited Jurisdiction Court Presiding Judge, or designee; County or City Emergency Planning Liaison, Risk Management (County, City or State); local law enforcement, sheriff and city police departments, fire department(s); court departments such as Probation, Clerk of Court, Judicial Staff Training, in-house security and facilities personnel; County/City Manager or designee; Information Technology Manager and representatives of other agencies or departments housed in shared government facilities

In addition to plan development, the standing planning committee(s) should oversee risk assessments, contingency plans to maintain essential court operations, and periodic emergency drills and audits.



The scope and nature of court business continuity plans are largely dependent on local factors, including geography, scale of court operations, availability of outside emergency resources, etc. Essential elements of business continuity plans are presented below. Trial court plans should also include standing policies and procedures, e.g., evacuation policy, intergovernmental agreements, etc.


In developing a plan, the court needs to identify key decision-makers, stakeholders and back-up persons who have the authority to order a building evacuation or court closure. In addition, a court must determine the chain of command and decision making authority contingent upon the

nature of emergency. In developing the plan, it must be recognized that the first response agency (Fire or Law Enforcement) has complete authority when life saving is the priority (note: plans should specify "first responder" agencies).

Remember:

- Courts with a plan in place can save lives and are better able to continue to serve the community during a crisis.
- Courts with contingency plans will in all likelihood experience much faster recovery of information systems and critical services.
- Existence of a prevention and disaster recovery plan may reduce liability and enhance the public image of the court.
- Disaster drills and stress testing of the plan create clear guidance for plan implementation.

Integrated Command System



COURT EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR ARIZONA COURTS

It is the intention of the Committee to give courts a outline from which to develop their own contingency plan. The following outline is intended to serve two related objectives: First, it is intended to provide direction to judicial officers and court staff during the initial hours of a critical incident affecting the court system. Whether an evacuation, serious disruption of court operations or court closure, court officials must establish a communications network and work cooperatively to assess the magnitude of the emergency and mitigate its effects. Second, the plan is intended to alert the courts to areas in which they must develop their own emergency plans. If plans are already available, they should be reviewed and updated and if not, courts must take steps to begin planning. This plan is designated as an outline because it not yet completed and cannot stand entirely on its own. Only individual courts can provide the detail needed for a successful emergency plan.

Because this plan serves these two objectives there are some areas of the plan that must be in place immediately while others will require time for planning and development. Where relevant those issues are addressed in the accompanying commentary.

A. Priorities:

During a critical incident affecting the courts the following priority of objectives will be observed by all judicial and administrative staff with regard to all actions taken:

- Reduce or prevent any loss of life and injury,
- Maintain justice system operations as required by the constitution and law,
- Protect court property, essential facilities, equipment, records and other assets
- Ensure continuous performance of critical and essential court functions during a critical incident.
- Achieve a timely and orderly recovery from a critical incident and resume full service to all court customers.

B. Critical Incidents:

Critical incidents include natural disasters, fires, health emergencies or quarantines, extended power outages, acts of foreign or domestic terrorism, computer sabotage, workplace violence, HAZMAT (hazardous materials) emergencies, prisoner escapes within the courthouse, hostage situations and biochemical attacks that have caused or are likely to cause full or partial shutdown of a court facility.

Recognizing a critical incident and reacting rapidly is critical to mitigating its duration and effects. When life, property, community and the business of the courts is threatened or affected, court administration should begin to act.

C. Declaration of a Court Emergency:

The presiding superior court judge of the affected county or Chief Judge as soon as practical and after consulting with appropriate authorities shall contact the Chief Justice, Vice-Chief Justice or designee and request that the Chief Justice declare a court emergency.

The declaration of a court emergency by the Chief Justice will activate this emergency plan and its effects may include: activating the emergency chain-of-command, emergency communications, critical incident response team and any emergency administrative authority provided by law and administrative order. If such contact is not possible, the presiding judge or chief judge may declare a court emergency by administrative order and provide notification of the order to the Supreme Court, appropriate county authorities, and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). During non-working hours the Supreme Court and AOC can be contacted through court security at 602-542-9500.

D. Authority/Chain-of-Command.

The presiding judge of the affected county as chief judicial officer in the county has legal and administrative authority over the courts in that county subject to authority of the Chief Justice, the Vice-Chief Justice and the Administrative Director. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals has legal and administrative authority over the respective division of the Court of Appeals.

The emergency chain-of-command may be contingent on the nature of the emergency. In the absence of the presiding judge, the associate presiding judge assumes authority. The presiding judge or associate may delegate broad administrative authority to court administrative staff over courts in the county when an emergency has been declared and when necessary and appropriate. In small counties with a single judge or a small bench, administrative lines of authority will have to extend beyond the bench to allow for clear lines of authority in the absence of one or all judges. Experience has shown that clear lines of authority are very important in emergency situations when decisions must be made quickly; so even with a large bench, designation of who is in charge is critical to quick action.

When an emergency has been declared the Chief Justice, Vice-Chief Justice or Administrative Director will assign a senior administrator from the AOC to the Courts to the superior court in the affected county to serve as liaison with the Supreme Court, courts in non-affected areas and the AOC.

The assigned administrator will serve as the point of contact for communication with the Supreme Court and AOC and other counties, a source for securing additional resources and will advise and assist the presiding judge with court administration during the emergency. The Chief Justice may also assign Judges, AOC staff or staff from other courts to assist during the emergency.

E. Communications.

All courts shall have an emergency communication plan and notification process containing at least the following elements:

- **A plan that indicates who is contacted and who is responsible for the calls.**
- **Phone lists in various forms, including wallet cards, that include home numbers, cell phone numbers, pagers and other points of contact.**
- **A procedure for activating the notification process (“phone tree”).**
- **A process for establishing contact with the AOC.**
- **A process for communication with other criminal justice agencies.**
- **A process for notification of the media and public of emergency court action.**
- **A plan for using alternatives to the wired telephone system, e.g. cell phones, radios, PA systems, pagers, walking, driving, messenger service.**
- **A common meeting location for court staff to establish contact.**

Phone trees and other elements of the communication plan should be documented and updated. Emergency phone numbers should be available in multiple locations and drills should be held to test plan effectiveness.

F. Evacuation Plans :

Each court shall have an emergency evacuation plan for each court and court-run detention facility in the county. The plan must be developed by a competent authority and approved by the presiding judge of the county or the chief judge and any other required authorities.

The presiding judicial officer or designee of the court shall have the authority to order evacuation of a court facility in an emergency upon consultation with local court security or law enforcement. If emergency responders are at the scene, the incident commander of the emergency response unit may order an evacuation and all court personnel shall obey.

Courts and detention facilities vary widely in size and no single evacuation plan fits all. The plan must provide for the evacuation of all judicial and court staff, detainees, customers and persons with disabilities and account for them after the facility is evacuated.

In addition to persons, plans should provide for the security of the facility, the security of any cash and financial operations, and the security of case records during evacuation. Even in very small facilities with only a few staff, it is important that all staff understand their roles during an evacuation. They must assist persons who are in the court, secure financial operations and case records, and assist any first responders to account for all persons in the court. All staff must have a copy of the plan and be familiar with their respective roles and responsibilities and participate in regular drills of the plan.

Plans shall designate who has the authority to order an evacuation and the chain of that authority. When detainees are evacuated, the plan should designate what happens to them after evacuation.

G. Critical Incident Response team(s).

A designated “critical incident response team(s)” shall be established for each court.

Depending on the size of courts and their distance from one another, the situation may require individual response teams for individual courts, groups of courts or for the entire county. Courts should designate critical staff, assign them to the court’s emergency response team and determine their respective roles in an emergency situation. These teams may include the presiding judge, associate presiding judge, court administrator, clerk of court, chief probation officer, court security officer and other senior level court executives. To ensure that this team can assemble quickly and function effectively, courts shall include in their plans the following:

- *Notification procedures for their emergency response team*
- *A designated meeting location in the event of an emergency*
- *Designated alternate meeting locations*
- *Preestablished protocol with other agencies when located in shared facilities*
- *A preestablished relationship with potential first responders*
- *Accountability for all court personnel*
- *Special assignments of staff during emergencies*
- *Cross training and specialized training for the emergency response team*
- *Possible sources of supplemental staffing*
- *Alternate emergency transportation and housing for staff*
- *Financial arrangements to handle personnel costs incurred during a critical incident.*

Experience in other courts facing critical incidents has shown that the existence of a competent, experienced management team, the ability to bring the team together quickly, and the system to provide good communications are vital elements to successfully managing a critical incident.

Fully developing a critical incident response team may take some time and planning by the court, however, the court should designate the members of this team immediately so that they can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

H. Persons under court jurisdiction or direction.

All courts shall prepare to manage persons under the supervision or direction of the court during an emergency.

These populations may include:

- *Adult and juvenile probationers*
- *In-custody detainees (in the courthouse)*
- *Juvenile detainees*
- *Persons under the protection of the court*
- *Persons on pre-trial release*

All courts should maintain, in a form that does not require computer access, the information required to identify and locate probationers on intensive supervision and those who may represent a special risk during an emergency (i.e. sex offenders in evacuation shelters). The agencies and persons responsible for locating special risk probationers during an emergency should be designated. Additional sources of staff to assist with this task should be identified. Experience has shown that if replacement staff are brought into an area to provide supervision they will need extra information to assist in locating probationers and possibly even pictures to help with identification. If the court utilizes electronic monitoring a method should be developed to verify the whereabouts of probationers without alerting them to a system failure.

Detainees in custody are normally the responsibility of law enforcement; however, their safety and protection must be an element in any evacuation and emergency plan developed by the court.

Smoke, dust or other environmental conditions may trigger the need to carefully monitor air quality at juvenile detention and treatment facilities including the health status of juvenile and adult detainees. Poor environmental conditions or individual health problems may require that they be moved to other secure locations. During a critical incident the presiding judge may want to determine if any detainees can be released to parents, etc.

During critical incidents persons who have orders of protection or injunctions against harassment may require special action to temporarily alter or modify those orders.

Emergencies may create special problems for persons under the courts protection. During evacuations of communities, courts may be called upon to assist in the determination of competency of persons who refuse directions from law enforcement and emergency responders.

Fully developing plans for managing persons under the court's jurisdiction may take some time and planning by the court, however, the court must begin to address these issues immediately so it can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

I. Court Facilities.

All courts shall identify alternative locations for court operations in the event that court facilities are damaged or become inaccessible during a critical incident.

Plans for alternative locations should include:

- *procedures for securing the court in the event of a civil disturbance or impending disaster,*
- *a plan for damage assessment and recovery,*
- *alternative locations for the court to conduct its business,*
- *sources of supplies and equipment to be used to conduct business in alternate locations,*
- *coordination with the AOC in computer replacement,*
- *coordination with other local public safety authorities when considering and selecting alternative sites,*
- *formal agreements with potential host entities,*
- *“take away” or “black bags” that contain essential equipment, forms and reference materials that can be used to resume court operations in an alternative location (contents include laptops, audio recorder, cell phones, supplies of forms, printer, paper, etc.).*

Fully developing a business recovery plan may take some time; however, the court must begin to address these issues immediately so it can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

J. Staffing.

Courts shall have a plan to staff the courts during a critical incident.

Staffing the court during a critical incident can be very difficult. Where evacuations or other situations affect entire communities court staff are often faced with a conflict between doing their jobs and caring for their families. Staff who work long hours suffer from fatigue and stress which can result in poor decision making. Overtime and work requirements such as FLSA become a challenge. In situations where additional staff has been brought into an area to work, those staff must be familiarized with the local system and integrated into the regular workforce. Courts that have managed through critical incidents have found that the more rapidly a near normal work schedule can be adopted the fewer staffing problems occur.

Fully developing an emergency staffing plan may take some time; however, the court must begin to address these issues immediately so it can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

K. Records.

Courts shall take appropriate measures to reduce the risks of loss and damage of records should a critical incident occur.

No court should delay evacuation to remove records. In situations where court facilities must be evacuated or are damaged it is likely that case files will be left behind and court staff forced to improvise. The best way to reduce damage to records is to take action to reduce the potential for damage before a critical incident occurs. Emergency record plans should:

Minimize the potential for record loss:

- *Follow all adopted record retention schedules and policies.*
- *Ensure that electronic records are regularly backed up and backups are stored offsite.*
- *Keep as many records electronically as possible*
- *Establish requirements for the protection and storage of records*
- *Identify experts who can help with record recovery in the event of an emergency.*
- *Reduce the volume of records to protect by remaining current with record archiving and destruction requirements.*
- *Have records management and recovery staff available to meet with first responding agencies.*

Provide for emergency operations with minimal record access:

- *Predetermine which court functions are critical and which records must be available.*
- *Determine how record processes can be performed manually.*
- *Print hard copies of the most basic court records so they are available(e.g., active case inventory and current financial accounting reports)*
- *Maintain temporary records on laptop computers for later downloading to a restored court system.*
- *Arrange for the provision of emergency replacement of computer equipment during an emergency.*
- *Arrange for nearby courts to share computer equipment during off hours.*
- *Use audio and video taping equipment and reconstruct records later.*

Court staff must also consider how to protect and manage evidence and exhibits during a critical incident.

Fully developing a record protection and recovery plan may take some time; however, the court must begin to address these issues immediately so it can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

L. Critical Court Functions.

The presiding judge of the affected county or chief judge of the court of appeals in consultation with representatives of the affected courts and agencies and the chief justice, vice-chief justice or designee shall determine which court functions are to be curtailed, moved, delayed or suspended. The presiding judge or chief judge may delegate to court administrators the implementation of plans to limit court functions.

It is possible that any court function may become time critical and courts must be prepared to make that judgment on an individual case basis. Presiding judges and court administrators may find themselves in the position of performing triage on court activities when resources are severely limited.

By separating court functions by their urgency, courts can determine the most effective strategies for recovery from an emergency. Critical cases can be transferred to neighboring courts or reassigned to available judges. Limited space in alternate facilities shall be reserved to serve the most critical court functions.

In an emergency only critical court functions, those the community cannot do without or which in their absence present a risk to life, health and property, must be immediately resumed. Other functions may be essential, required by law, or difficult to lose, but not necessarily time critical to restore. Some are non-essential functions that are nice to have, but their loss is an inconvenience and their resumption can be deferred for some time. Actions to limit court functions should be documented by court order and the Supreme Court should be immediately notified of such action. Examples of critical court functions that must be restored as rapidly as possible include but are not limited to:

- *Initial appearances*
- *Preliminary hearings*
- *Arraignments*
- *Orders of protection*
- *Injunctions against harassment*
- *Emergency actions (injunctions, etc.) related to the ongoing emergency*
- *Judicial consent for minor abortion*
- *Special actions - injunctive*

Essential court functions that may be resumed after a slightly longer period include:

- *Activities related to observing and protecting constitutional rights*
- *Appellate activities*
- *Criminal trials*
- *Bond review hearings*
- *Probation revocations*
- *Other in-custody issues*
- *Mental health calendars where custody is involved.*

Court functions that may be deferred for some time include:

- *Traffic issues*
- *Civil cases - non-injunctive*
- *Administrative issues other than necessary to critical functions*

The nature of the critical incident itself may cause an increase in particular types of litigation or it may spawn its own litigation, which will become a consideration in determining critical court functions.

M. Emergency Court Orders.

Pursuant to the Arizona Constitution Art. VI, Sec. 3, the Supreme Court can adopt administrative orders extending emergency administrative authority to other courts to close courts, alter hours of operation, adopt, amend and suspend rules and orders and take other necessary administrative actions concerning court staff and operations. When communication with the AOC and Supreme Court is available the presiding judge shall consult with them prior to the issuance of local emergency orders to ensure such authority is provided. However, in an extreme emergency when there is neither the time or capacity for consultation each court must be prepared to deal with local emergencies promptly without outside assistance.

If it becomes necessary to issue an emergency order the local court shall consult with the Supreme Court to determine by whom and in what form the order is to be issued. However, when communication is not available the local court may be required to act on its own. In that case any local order should invoke any state emergency declarations by the Governor or Supreme Court orders on emergency authority, specify the nature of the emergency, be effective for only the duration of the emergency and include a provision providing for immediate transmittal to the Supreme Court for review. Justice of the Peace and Municipal courts should consult and coordinate with the county presiding judge who will assist with local and countywide orders.

A court facing an emergency may be required to adopt any or all of the following by emergency administrative order. Unless a state declaration of emergency provides otherwise, courts must remain aware that state law and state statutory requirements will continue in effect and cannot be abrogated by local administrative orders. AOC legal staff will provide assistance regarding these orders.

Court operations:

- *Provide for 24-hour operation of one or more courts and “on call” status for judges to handle emergency matters.*
- *Assign cases to neighboring courts and reassign judges*
- *Relocate court operations*
- *Cancel court calendars and subpoenas*
- *Assign custodial responsibility for court funds*
- *Provide for alternate signing and delivery of filings, orders, and other documents.*

- *Cancel jury trials and suspend jury duty*
- *Continue trials and exclude reset time*
- *Continue in-custody matters involving transport*
- *Authorize constables or other court personnel to serve process*
- *Establish a telephone hotline or web site for court information*

Personnel:

- *Cancel leave and vacation for court employees and extend leave usage periods*
- *Make certain staff is available “around-the-clock” or on-call*
- *Approve overtime for court staff*
- *Reimburse court employees for use of personal vehicles and phones*
- *Expand duties of staff to handle emergency matters*
- *Establish rosters of volunteers and provide authority*

Probation:

- *Make special assignments of personnel to emergency units*
- *Suspend reporting requirements and conditions that may be impossible to perform*
- *Vacate transport orders*
- *Vacate hearings where parties are unable to attend*
- *Defer payment and assessment due dates*

Juveniles:

- *Arrange for evacuation of detention centers and treatment facilities*
- *Provide for emergency supervision and counseling*

Facilities and equipment:

- *Close or consolidate courts if facilities and staff are not available*
- *Transfer court functions to alternative facilities*
- *Transfer files for safekeeping*
- *Move equipment and data to a secure offsite location*
- *Open detention centers and other facilities for housing*
- *Authorize use of vehicles and facilities by emergency personnel (under supervision of court staff)*

N. Finances.

Courts must plan for disruptions in the business systems that support their financial activities.

Credit card acceptance, check verification, normal banking functions and point of sale systems may not function or have limited availability. Plans and equipment should be available for converting to manual systems of receipting and accounting. Normal procedures for procurement of equipment and supplies may also be disrupted.

Courts must carefully track expenditures that result from a critical incident.

The critical incident itself will likely create additional expenditures for the court. These include per diem and lodging for supplemental staff, overtime costs, emergency purchases of supplies and equipment, and equipment rental. Such expenditures should be tracked in the anticipation that emergency costs may be reimbursed in the future. The AOC representative should be consulted on financial issues and will serve as a contact for seeking additional financial assistance.

O. Planning.

Courts shall participate in planning for critical incidents both at the court level and at a multi agency level when opportunities are available. Each large court shall establish a standing committee to oversee risk assessments and make contingency plans to maintain essential operations and to conduct periodic emergency drills and audits. Additionally, the court shall either have its own multi-agency emergency planning committee or be a participant in an existing local, city or county level emergency planning committee.

No single plan will meet the needs of every court. Local planning is required to determine the specifics and fill in the gaps. The planning process should be as efficient as possible and whenever possible, courts should combine their efforts. It may not be necessary for multiple courts to work individually, if a single countywide effort can accomplish the same result. It is important, however, that every court involved participate in the process and understand the final plan and its requirements.

Fully developing emergency plans may take some time; however, the court must begin to address the issue immediately so it is prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete

P. Training, testing and plan dissemination.

Courts shall provide regular training for their staff in responding to critical incidents. Court staff should be assigned training responsibilities and the resources to meet them.

Plans should be tested on a regular basis with all staff participating, including judges. Drills should be followed by debriefings and feedback to management, staff and the court's emergency planning committee.

Plans and emergency procedures should be documented and summarized in forms that allow for widespread distribution to staff. Posters and notices should be provided for the public and staff. Instructions for emergency procedures should be provided to staff in the form of wallet cards, phone pamphlets, etc. that can be used for easy and quick referral.

Fully developing a training plan may take some time; however, the court must begin to address these issues immediately so it can be prepared to respond to an emergency that occurs before planning is complete.

Courthouse Security

Arizona courts represent justice for its citizens. To administer justice under the law, court facilities must be as safe and secure as practicable for all those who visit and work there. There are those in our society who for psychological, political, criminal or fanatical reasons will seek to disrupt or damage those who they perceive are against them. Quite often, these acts will be focused on government institutions or government representatives.

One of the most visible, active and at times controversial branches of government is the judicial system. History has shown that the judicial system is not immune from assaults by individuals or groups who would use explosives and firearms to achieve their goals. Nationally, attacks have been directed to not only court facilities, operations, court support staff, judges and their families but also, at the users of the court and its services.

As a result, court security planning must emphasize awareness, prevention, containment and control—all directed toward protection of life and property. Effective planning, implementation of policies and procedures, application of appropriate security equipment and training of security personnel are essential for meeting the goal of providing a safe and secure judicial environment.

The court security standards recommended on the following pages are recommendations suggested by this committee. They are not meant to be requirements imposed on local jurisdictions. The committee recognizes the limitations under which local courts must operate. The intent of this section is to provide general standards or guidelines that each court may follow in designing its specific security plan. If the recommendations are followed, the likelihood of success in thwarting a disaster can be better achieved.

Recommendation #1: Policy

A. Each court and clerk's office shall have a Court Security Policy and Procedure Manual.

A Court Security Policy and Procedure Manual written in coordination with the clerk's office governing the security of the court and its facilities, shall be established and reviewed annually to ensure consistent and appropriate security procedures. The manual should include: a physical security plan, routine security operations, a special operations plan, a hostage situation response plan, a high risk trial plan, and emergency procedures for fire, bomb, and other disasters.

B. Each court shall establish a "Use of Force" policy for court security personnel.

Security personnel require specific direction and training on the appropriate use of force. Courts should adopt "use of force" policies that have been reviewed and approved by appropriate legal staff and should establish training requirements to the level of force deemed appropriate and proper for each court.

C. All courts should periodically conduct a "risk assessment audit" using professional court security auditors.

A formal security audit of the court, its facilities and the clerk's office can provide valuable direction to identify, correct and eliminate conditions or deficiencies that place personnel and facilities at risk of violent or criminal acts. Court security audits should be conducted by a qualified court security professional using defined and approved court security standards.

D. All courts should immediately report all security breaches to local law enforcement and the AOC using a standardized incident reporting form.

Because security is so important for the courts and clerk's office, security incidents should be reported accurately whenever they occur. There should be a standardized reporting method and a formal review process to evaluate the procedures followed after a security violation, criminal act or threat that has occurred to determine if established policies require correction or revision and to assess accountability and responsibility.

E. Weapons shall not be permitted in the courthouse facility.

Each court should establish by court order rules governing the carrying of weapons into the courthouse by law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers acting outside the scope of their employment should not be permitted to bring weapons into the court facility.

Recommendation #2: Court Personnel and Training

A. Each county shall have a standing Committee on Security for its courts.

Specific security needs inevitably vary from location to location due to local conditions and changing circumstances. Thus security must be addressed within each jurisdiction and by a formal mechanism.

Court security issues affect many sectors of the community and include differing local needs and serious funding concerns. A local Committee on Security should be established to address these concerns. The committee should include the Court Security Coordinator, Court Emergency Services Coordinator, representatives from the judicial divisions, clerk's offices, sheriff's department or other agencies that provides security to the court, representatives from the county and other appropriate bar and community groups.

B. Each court and clerk's office shall have a Security Coordinator and Emergency Services Coordinator.

Each court and clerk's office should have one person, the court Security Coordinator, who is responsible for maintaining the court's security procedures and training for court staff. The court should also have a person serving as an Emergency Services Coordinator who would be the liaison with the local Emergency Services Board. The Emergency Services Coordinator will ensure that the court's contingency plan is carried out in times of emergencies. In smaller courts one person could fill both roles.

C. Court Security personnel shall meet appropriately established standards of experience, training and performance.

Court Security personnel should be assigned specifically and in sufficient numbers to court security to ensure the security of the court and its facilities. Court security staff should be trained to a level of force deemed proper by local courts. Court Security officers should receive specific training on court security issues and weapons instruction if appropriate, that is specific to the court setting.

D. Training of court security personnel shall be "career oriented" with a core curriculum that is court security specific.

Training for court staff should be safety and security focused. The committee supports the development of a standardized core safety and security curriculum for court security staff.

E. Each court and clerk's office shall provide security training for all court employees.

Court staff must know what is expected of them at all times. Security procedures should be reviewed annually with all staff. A mandatory training program should be established that include regular in-service security training and is COJET approved. It is also

recommended that the AOC develop a core training curriculum addressing safety and security issues for court related personnel.

6. Minimum standards shall be developed for use when hiring and screening court security personnel.

It is recognized that if a local court contracts with a security firm, the agency being hired must adhere to local hiring and screening practices and have its security personnel trained and certified in a manner consistent with state certification standards. The committee recognizes that some local courts hire part-time security personnel. In those instances, part-time employees must be trained and certified to state certification and training standards. The committee further recognizes that local courts from time to time hire part time law enforcement personnel. In these instances, local law enforcement must be oriented to courthouse/courtroom security issues as a condition of employment by a state certification agency. In each case, the committee supports the development of a standardized “scope of responsibility” for court security personnel.

Recommendation #3: Limiting Access to the Courthouse

A. Courts should limit access to one main entrance and exit when possible. All entrances should have weapons screening capabilities.

Weapon screening is an essential part of court security. No weapons should be permitted in the court facility, except those carried by court security personnel and those allowed under a local court rule. A policy should be developed that will identify who is allowed to carry a weapons and under what conditions. The policy should be reviewed on a regular basis.

Everyone entering the court must be subject to a screening process. Limiting access to one main entrance allows for better observation and detection and reduces the cost of weapons screening equipment and staff. If the staff and judiciary use nonpublic entrances, provisions need to be made for weapon screening at this entrance as well. Entrances without screening should be locked and equipped with an alarm and a sign reading "Emergency exit only; alarm will sound".

B. All persons entering the courthouse shall be subject to security screening.

One of the best security measures is the interdiction of weapons. The only certain method for interdiction is to screen all persons without exception when they enter the facility. All persons entering the court facility should be subject to a court security screening process. All screening should occur for each visit to the court regardless of purpose or hour.

Mail is a common method of delivering bombs and biological agents. Without adequate screening, mail and other items delivered to a courthouse cannot be considered safe. Technology is readily available to complete nonintrusive examination. Minimum standards of security should include magnetometers, x-ray machines and secure storage lockers for weapons.

C. All court employees should wear a visible identification card.

Employees should wear picture ID cards at all times. This ID may also be used as a key card for access to offices and other areas within the courthouse.

D. All courts and/or funding units should have a schedule for routine maintenance and testing of all security equipment.

Equipment should be properly maintained and tested on a schedule in order to ensure it is in proper working condition.

E. Signs notifying the public of weapons screening should be prominently displayed.

The goal of a security system is to deter incidents. Proper signage indicates that the court is conducting weapons screenings. Signs should state that both individuals and

their belongings will be searched. The signs should be large, positioned both inside and outside the courthouse and in appropriate languages.

F. All locking mechanisms should be at least as sophisticated as electronic access cards or better.

Strict control of all locking devices should be maintained. Access to keys and courthouse access cards by non security personnel should be limited and controlled by security personnel. New locking technology provides better security and easier replacement when compromised. The system should be administered by someone directly responsible to the court administrator or presiding judge.

G. Courts should have both intrusion and duress alarms within the courthouse and provide the ability to ensure after-hour security during emergencies.

Intrusion alarms are designed to alert the court of unauthorized entry after hours. Duress alarms are designed to signal for help immediately. All courtrooms and hearing rooms should be equipped with duress alarms connected to a central security station. Door alarms should also be placed in all exit doors from the building. As part of a comprehensive security plan, each court, in conjunction with law enforcement should adopt procedures for the security of judges and court personnel at times other than normal working hours.

H. All courts should have a “Caller ID” system installed on their phone system.

Caller ID will allow courts to identify individuals who call in bomb threats or make threatening calls to the court.

Recommendation #4: Facility and Office Design

- A. Facility office design should address security issues. Buildings should be designed so as to protect against attack.**

New construction or remodeling of court facilities should include a review of circulation patterns that govern the movement of people in the courthouse. Judges, court personnel and prisoners should have separate routes to and from the courtroom. Waiting areas should be available to allow separation of parties, victims and witnesses when possible.

Each court should identify areas that require additional protection. Courts should also identify rooms that can be used as “safe rooms” where staff can go during an incident.

- B. All courts should make arrangements to install physical barriers around the courthouse when necessary to limit the approach of cars and trucks.**

Each court should decide, in cooperation with their local law enforcement agency and funding unit, if barriers are warranted. Information about where to get barriers and how they will be deployed should be a part of any court’s security plan.

- C. All courts should have secure parking for judges, staff, jurors, and witnesses who have been threatened.**

Some security incidents have occurred in parking areas before a victim even reaches the courthouse. Judges and staff who are vulnerable to attack simply by virtue of their position need secure/unidentified parking areas. Jurors and threatened witnesses also need secure parking if they are to fulfill their roles in the system.

Ideally, parking would be in a fenced area, with vehicle pedestrian access limited by a gate controlled by a card-key or other access control device. Judges and staff should have secured access to secured corridors or elevators from the parking area.

- D. All courts should have a secure holding area for prisoners.**

Courts need secure holding areas where persons in custody can be locked up and isolated while waiting to appear in court or be returned to jail or prison. Persons in custody should be escorted into the facility through areas that are not accessible to the public by law enforcement and corrections staff. When a separate entrance is not available and public hallways must be utilized, prisoners should be handcuffed behind the back and when appropriate, secured with leg restraints. Every court should work with the local sheriff or police to develop emergency procedures for prisoner control and evacuation.

E. All environmental controls in court facilities and the clerk's offices should be secured, with access restricted to authorized personnel.

In order to avoid tampering and sabotage, access to controls for heating, air conditioning, ventilation, etc., should be limited to authorized staff. Outside air intake mechanisms should also be secured so they cannot be used as access to the building or as a conduit for biochemical attack.

F. When practical, closed-circuit video surveillance for courthouse and clerk counter monitoring is recommended.

Public notification that the courthouse is under video surveillance will serve as a deterrent. The design of some existing courthouses may require a greater reliance on supplemental security devices such as video equipment. Closed circuit video surveillance should be effectively monitored. Closed circuit video surveillance should include the court facility parking area, entrance to the court facility, court lobby, courtroom, clerk front counter and all other public areas of the court facility.

G. Funding agencies should adequately fund court security personnel and programs for the protection of the public, court personnel and property.

Put simply, security saves lives and protects property. Funding agencies need to recognize this and fund security operations to an optimal level. Whenever possible and feasible, courts should enter into Interagency Agreements to share valuable resources in order to help defray to costs to funding agencies.

Appendix

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

In the Matter of:)
)
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE) Administrative Order
COMMITTEE ON COURT SECURITY) No. 2003-21
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS)
_____)

To ensure access to the courts as required by Arizona's Constitution, Article VI, Section 17, the Arizona court system must be prepared to manage a variety of emergency situations including those originating within the courts, natural disasters, terrorism and extended utility and information system outages. The courts are institutions where many critical decisions affecting disputes, lives, children and families are made, where emotions often run high, and where the potential for serious disruption and violence is always a concern. Additionally, like any modern institution, the courts are part of their community and vulnerable to incidents and emergencies that affect the greater community. Finally, courts house not only the activities of courts, but also critical data networks and valuable physical and electronic records. Thus the courts, the courthouse and the systems that support their work are critical elements of civil government that must be protected and must continue to operate in an emergency.

In accordance with Arizona Code of Judicial Administration ' 1-104, the Chief Justice may establish advisory committees to the Arizona Judicial Council to assist the Council in carrying out its responsibilities. Therefore in keeping with the Court's strategic goals of providing access to justice and being accountable through increased efforts to ensure that court faculties, staff and users remain safe from physical harm; it is appropriate to review the security environment of Arizona's courts and recommend policies and procedures to enhance the preparedness of the courts to manage emergency situations.

Now, therefore, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED that the Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness is established as follows:

1. PURPOSE:

The Committee should identify areas of concern and recommend best security practices, policies and procedures that can be adopted by the Arizona Judicial Council and by courts in the Arizona court system to ensure that court staff, judges, litigants, jurors and other court users are provided safe, functional, dignified and accessible court facilities. The Committee should also develop recommendations and guidelines for emergency preparedness and contingency planning for the courts. This work should be carried out in a manner that

recognizes geographic and size differences between courts and recognizes that any plans and recommendations must be achievable with resources or support that exists or are likely to be available.

The Committee is directed to give attention to the following areas:

1. General courthouse security and the appropriate level of security for each type of court.
2. Screening, selection and training of court security staff.
3. Physical security of data networks and systems.
4. Possible events, incidents and emergencies that threaten public and personnel safety, the operation of courts and the administration of justice and appropriate responses.
5. Methods for the collection and distribution of information concerning potential or impending court emergencies.
6. Communication between courts during emergencies.
7. Guidelines for emergency preparedness and contingency planning.
8. Continuity of operations plans.
9. Guidelines for the closing or alteration of business hours or locations when there is the threat of harm in the form of weapons or threats, terrorism, natural disaster or other emergency.
10. Other areas that the Committee deems necessary to complete its work.

The Committee should remain mindful of the need to coordinate its work with the Committee on Technology and with the Probation Safety committee where appropriate.

2. **MEMBERSHIP:**

The Chief Justice shall appoint the Committee members, a chairperson, a vice chairperson and such additional members as may be necessary. The membership of the Committee is attached as an Appendix.

2. **MEETINGS:**

Meetings shall be scheduled at the discretion of the Committee Chair. All meetings shall comply with the Open Meeting Policy of the Arizona Judicial Department.

3. **REPORTS:**

The Committee shall submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Council at the June 2003 meeting.

4. **STAFF:**


The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide staff for the Committee and, as feasible given financial and staffing limitations, may conduct or coordinate research as requested by the Committee.

Dated this _____ day of _____, 2003.

CHARLES E. JONES
Chief Justice


Attachment: Appendix A

Court Operations Prioritization Chart



Court Recovery Structure

Disaster Recovery Court Team Structure



Sample Forms

Team Recovery Progress Report

Daily Security Checklist

Weapons Screening Checklist

Security Incident Report

Telephone Tree/Calling Plan

Security Audit Checklist

Emergency Administrative Orders

Team Recovery Progress Report

Team Name: _____
Date/Time: _____
Prepared By: _____

Progress Since Last Reporting Timeframe:

Problems Encountered Requiring Management Response Team Support

Requests for Additional Expenditures

Requests for Additional Support

Other Concerns

DAILY SECURITY CHECKLIST

DAILY CHECKLIST

Date: _____

EXTERIOR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building walk around completed • All landscaping checked • Trash receptacles checked • Lighting checked • Loading dock checked • Parking area checked 	YES	NO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trash receptacles searched • All chairs (including behind and bottom of chair) checked • Public restrooms searched <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Towel dispensers checked - Under all sinks checked -All commodes checked • All hallways checked including visual scan of false ceilings • Fire extinguishers checked • Utility control panel locked • Access to restricted areas locked • Emergency lights tested 	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
COURTROOMS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duress alarms tested • Emergency lights tested • Gallery area searched including all chairs (behind and the bottom of chair) • Attorney area tables searched • Bench area secured • Court reporter/recorder area searched • Fire extinguishers checked • Utility control panels locked • Access to restricted areas locked • Jury area searched • Jury room searched 	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
RESTRICTED AREAS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duress alarms tested • Emergency lights tested • Access doors locked • Hallways checked 	_____ _____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____ _____
PRISONER AREAS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cell(s) searched • SCBA checked • Duress alarms tested • Emergency lights tested • All monitors checked 	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____ _____ _____

WEAPONS SCREENING CHECKLIST

<p>PRIOR TO OPENING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building search completed • Alarms tested • Magnetometer checked with test weapon • CCTV, if available, turned on and checked • Hand-held magnetometers available • Trays available • Signs properly displayed • Roping (to control lines) in place 	<p>YES</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>NO</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>
<p>ON-GOING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Single file lines maintained • Periodic external search conducted • Observation maintained 	<p>YES</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>NO</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>
<p>END OF DAY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search of building conducted • Outside search conducted • All contraband properly disposed • All equipment turned off and secured 	<p>YES</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>NO</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>

DIVISION TELEPHONE TREE/CALLING PLAN

DIVISION CALL PROCEDURE

	Name					
Initiator:	John Doe					
Alternate Initiator 1	Jim Smith					
Alternate Initiator 2	Jane Jones					
Alternate Initiator 3	Bill Grimes					
Initiator then calls						
	Mike Dow					
	Terry Sobe					
	Bill Grimes					
Bill then Calls:		Don Bean				
			Don Calls:	<i>Jen Gold</i>	<i>Jen Calls:</i>	<i>Jean Burns</i>
		Missy Johns				
			Missy Calls:	<i>Jim Johnson</i>	<i>Jim Calls:</i>	<i>Kim Zakko</i>
				<i>Jenny Jones</i>		
				<i>Lynn Stone</i>		
				<i>Chrissy Snow</i>		
		Tom Tunes				
			Tom Calls:	<i>Cathy Cole</i>		
				<i>Kitty Crouch</i>		
				<i>Raymond Neon</i>		
	Dick Nixon					
Dick then Calls:		Henry Rice				
			Henry Calls:	<i>All Security Staff</i>		
				Sally Seasaw		
					<i>Sally Calls:</i>	<i>Charlie Rich</i>
						<i>Richard Box</i>
		Tim Kane				
			Tim Calls:	<i>Mary Brown</i>		
				<i>All Maintenance Staff</i>		
		Rose Bunch				
			Rose Calls:	Dennis Dean		
				<i>Dennis Calls:</i>	<i>All Custodial Staff</i>	
	Dan Davis					
Dan then Calls:			Dan Calls:	<i>Craig Eagle</i>		
					<i>Craig Calls:</i>	<i>Nancy Peterson</i>
						<i>Nancy Calls:</i> <i>Meg Tilly</i>
	Fran Lane					
Fran then Calls:			Fran Calls:	Lucy Downs		
					<i>Lucy Calls:</i>	<i>Virginia Lewis</i>
				Ben Beady		
					<i>Ben Calls:</i>	<i>Kristy Brinkley</i>

SECURITY INCIDENT REPORT

ARIZONA SUPREME COURT SECURITY DEPARTMENT INCIDENT REPORT			
Type of Incident:	Officer Assigned:	Report #:	Date/Time:

REFERENCE KEY: C-COMPLAINANT, W-WITNESS, V-VICTIM, S-SUSPECT, O-OTHER


KEY	NAME	DEPARTMENT/ADDRESS	TELEPHONE

NARRATIVE:

REPORTING OFFICERS SIGNATURE:	DATE:	SUPERVISORS SIGNATURE:
SUPPLEMENT: Y N		PAGE OF

SECURITY AUDIT CHECKLIST

SECURITY AUDIT CHECK-LIST AND RESULTS



ORGANIZATION:

ADDRESS:

POINTS OF CONTACT:

PERSON(S) COMPLETING SURVEY:

#	A. BUILDING PERIMETER	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is perimeter of facility clearly defined by a fence, wall, or other type of physical barrier?			
2	Does the barrier limit vehicle, pedestrian traffic?			
3	Are gates solid and in good condition?			
4	Are gates properly locked and secured?			
5	Are gate hinges secured?			
6	Briefly describe any barriers and their condition:			

#	B. BUILDING EXTERIOR LIGHTS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is the entire exterior of building lighted?			
2	Are lights on all nights?			
3	Is wiring inspected regularly?			
4	Are lights controlled automatically?			
5	Are control switches inaccessible to unauthorized persons?			
6	Excluding Parking Areas, describe the lighting of building grounds as: circle one a. Fully Illuminated b. Partially Illuminated c. Not Illuminated			
7	Is there sufficient light around building to discourage criminal activity? (Unlawful entry or attacks)			
8	Are entrances lighted sufficiently to discourage attacks against persons and/or vehicles?			
9	Are there blind/dark spots for criminals to hide?			

#	C. PARKING AREA	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is there controlled entry into the parking lot?			
2	Is there CCTV or monitoring of the parking lot?			
3	Are there reserved parking spaces for employees?			
4	Are there spots reserved for certain positions/departments? By name?			

5	Are signs posted, indicating who parks in these spots?			
6	Do reserved spaces block access by fire/police/ambulance?			
7	Is parking lot adequately lighted?			
8	Is parking for staff reasonably close?			

#	D. BUILDING EXTERIOR LANDSCAPING	YES	NO	N/A
1	Do landscape features provide hiding places for potential intruders or criminals to hide?			
2	Are there loose items (bricks, stones or sticks) that can be used as a weapon?			
3	Is the main entrance facing a major roadway?			
4	Does landscaping block lighting?			
5	Can lighting be improved?			
6	Is property flat and does it provide a clear line of sight?			
7	Any areas on the outermost ring of landscape to hide?			
8	Are shrubs, bushes scheduled for trimming on a regular basis?			

#	E. DOORS, WINDOWS, OPENINGS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are all exterior doors properly equipped with cylinder locks, or quality padlocks and hasps?			
2	Are all exterior doors equipped with intrusion alarm?			
3	Are all hinge pins internally located, welded or treated to prevent easy removal?			
4	Are exterior doors, not needed for public entrance, equipped with self-closing/locking features?			
5	Can door jams be spread?			
6	Are exterior locks firmly mounted?			
7	Are all unused doors permanently locked?			
8	Are all windows not needed for ventilation permanently sealed or locked?			
9	Is exterior glass laminated or tempered?			
10	Are there suitable locks on all windows that open?			
11	Any alarms on windows? Glass break? Intrusion?			
12	Is glass obscured, smoked or tinted to prevent observation from outside?			
13	Are window bars and mesh securely fastened to prevent easy removal?			

14	Is internal access to the roof controlled?			
15	Are exterior openings to the building controlled?			
16	Does roof opening have intrusion alarms?			
17	Access to roof by: Fire escape? Another building? Ladder?			

#	F. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM/SAFETY	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is there a Fire Control System in the building?			
2	Is there a sprinkler system in the building?			
3	Are sprinkler systems tested and maintained on a regular basis?			
4	Are smoke detectors installed?			
5	Are smoke detectors tested on a regular basis?			
6	Where is the fire control panel?			
7	Is fire system connected to automated system?			
8	Is there emergency lighting in the Fire Stairwells?			
9	Are fire stairwells free of trash/debris?			
10	Are Fire Exits designed with delayed or alarmed devices?			

#	G. ALARMS/CAMERAS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Does building have intrusion alarms?			
2	Is system regularly tested?			
3	Where does system terminate?			
4	Who responds?			
5	Is the alarm notification list on file at the monitoring station up to date?			
6	Is the number of persons authorized to make changes to the list limited?			
7	Are codes of terminated employees removed from the system?			
8	Are records maintained?			
9	Who does maintenance on system?			
10	Any CCTV?			
11	Does CCTV monitor entrances/exits?			
12	Does CCTV monitor parking areas?			
13	Does CCTV monitor waiting areas?			

14	Who controls/monitors CCTV? _____			
15	Any weaknesses in system?			

	H. SAFES/VAULTS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Describe Safe/Vault:			
2	Is safe fire rated?			
3	Is safe alarmed and monitored?			

#	I. UTILITIES/EMERGENCY POWER	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is main power source dependable?			
2	Is there dependable auxiliary power source for emergencies?			
3	Is any emergency lighting provided?			

#	J. ELEVATORS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is there a separate staff/public elevator?			
2	Can elevator be programmed?			
3	Is elevator monitored?			
4	Are there emergency communications in elevators?			

#	K. STORAGE AREAS FOR RECORDS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is there a secured records depository?			
2	Are records secured after hours?			
3	Are records secured during hours?			
4	Is the records holding area equipped with fire protection?			
5	Is the records holding area monitored?			

#	L. PUBLIC WAITING ROOMS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are public waiting rooms available?			
2	Can public waiting rooms be monitored by staff?			
3	Does public have free access to staff areas from waiting rooms?			
4	Can staff permit the public access into staff areas?			

5	Any safety features to protect staff from public?			
6	Is there glass? Plexiglas? Tempered glass?			
7	Can the staff summon assistance quickly?			

#	M. PUBLIC ACCESS TO STAFF AREAS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Any control of visitors?			
2	Are visitors required to check-in? Sign-in?			
3	Are visitors identified in any fashion?			
4	Are visitors escorted in staff areas?			
5	Will staff confront visitors? Ask if assistance is required?			

#	N. STAFF AREAS (Offices)	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is access to staff areas controlled?			
2	Is the office out of view from public?			
3	Are security checks made in staff areas?			
4	Are fire extinguishes marked and easily reached?			
5	Is staff required or encouraged to wear ID Badges			
6	Are visitors confronted? May I help you?			

#	O. STAFF AREAS (Lounge/Conference Rooms)	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is lounge/conference room in public view?			
2	Are security checks made of these areas periodically?			
3	Any safety, security reminders posted?			
4	Are files, records left in these areas?			

#	P. TRAINING	YES	NO	N/A
1	Does staff receive any security/safety training?			
2	Is any information provided to staff about security within the facility?			
3	Is any one person responsible for safety/security?			
4	Does building have Floor Wardens?			
5	Is one person responsible for training?			

#	Q. KEY CONTROL	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are locks changed when keys are unaccounted for?			
2	Has someone been designated as key control manager?			
3	Are keys that are not issued in a locked container?			
4	Are key control records maintained?			
5	Is key recovery part of the exit interview process?			

#	R. OTHER SECURITY SYSTEMS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Does the facility have a card or badge access system?			
2	Do electronic door strikes revert to open when power fails?			
3	Are the extra access cards secured in a locked container?			
4	When was the system last audited for terminated employees, changes, etc.			
5	Are cards or badges recovered in the exit interview process?			

#	S. CONTROL SIGNS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are signs posted to indicate the following: 1. Personnel a) Employee entrances and exits? b) Visitor entrances and exits? c) Delivery entrances?			
2	Are signs posted to indicate 2. Vehicles a) Visitor Parking areas? b) Handicap spaces (as determined by local code)			
3	Are building evacuation routes posted?			
4	Fire exits designated and properly lit?			
5	Is fire extinguisher signage in place?			
6	Is sprinkler system control signage in place?			

#	T. TRASH CONTROLS	YES	NO	N/A
1	Is confidential data shredded rather than recycled or tossed in the trash?			
2	Are janitorial personnel monitored in any fashion?			
3	Are trash areas checked to detect hidden property or confidential material?			

#	U. EMERGENCY PLANNING	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are emergency plans in effect for fire?			
2	Are emergency plans in effect for bomb threats?			
3	Has an Emergency Coordinator been designated?			
4	Do emergency plans provide for evacuation of the building?			
5	Have emergency plans been coordinated with local officials? (fire & police)			
6	Are floor or area wardens designated?			
7	Are employees aware of their responsibilities in an emergency?			
8	Are emergency plans annually tested? (fire drills)			
9	Are appropriate responsibilities assigned during emergency circumstances?			

#	V. I/T SECURITY	YES	NO	N/A
1	Are separated employee's network and email access terminated?			
2	Are separated employee's phone privileges terminated?			
3	Are separated employee's card access terminated?			
4	Are separated employee's issued property (pagers, cell phones and laptops) recovered?			

1. **INITIAL OBSERVATIONS**
2. **OUTSIDE APPEARANCE (during hours of darkness and daylight)**
3. **INTERIOR OF FACILITY**
4. **FIRE SAFETY, CONTROLS & EVACUATIONS**
5. **PERSONNEL ISSUES**
6. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

SUPERIOR COURT OF NAVAJO COUNTY
STATE OF ARIZONA



Gloria J. Kindig
Presiding Judge



Arno Hall
Court Administrator

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 2002- 007

Whereas a State of Emergency has been declared for Navajo County due to the Rodeo Fire; and

Whereas the Pinetop-Lakeside and Show Low Justice Courts are in the Evacuation Alert area; and

Whereas the Pinetop-Lakeside Probation Office is within the Alert area; and

Whereas the number of attorneys and parties who are scheduled to be in Court live within the Evacuation Alert area;

It is hereby ordered closing the Pinetop-Lakeside Justice Court, Show Low Justice Court And Pinetop-Lakeside Probation Office until such time as the Evacuation Alert has been lifted, and,

It is further ordered canceling the Superior Court calendars for June 20 and 21, and,

It is further ordered authorizing Snowflake Justice Court and Winslow Justice Court to hear all emergency matters from Pinetop-Lakeside and Show low Justice Courts, and,

It is further ordered placing all Probation Officers and vehicles at the disposal of the Navajo County Sheriff's Office, with the Chief Probation Officer taking direction from the Sheriff's Office, including any delegation by the Sheriff's Office; and,

It is further ordered approving overtime as needed for Staff until the emergency is lifted, and,

It is further ordered suspending the report requirement for all Probationers in the Evacuation Alert areas, until the alert is lifted and,

It is further ordered suspending the report requirement for all Probationers, within the Evacuation Alert area, to notify their Probation Officer prior to relocation, however they must provide that notice as soon as possible after any evacuation, and,

It is further ordered authorizing the Snowflake Justice Court to take charge of the funds from the Pinetop-Lakeside and Show Low Justice Courts.

It is further ordered authorizing the expenditures of such funds as necessary as authorized by the Presiding Judge or Associate-Presiding Judge Nielson.

Entered this 20th of June, 2002.

Presiding Judge



SUPERIOR COURT of the STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Navajo

DIVISION III
GLORIA J. KINDIG
PRESIDING JUDGE

MARLA MYERS
ACTING COURT
ADMINISTRATOR

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 2002-017

Whereas, there is a continuing State of Emergency in Navajo County; and

Whereas, there are residents of Navajo County that have been summoned to report to jury duty;
and

Whereas, there have been evacuations in the areas of Pinedale, Linden, Claysprings, Heber,
Overgaard, Airpine, Pinetop-Lakeside and Show Low due to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire; and

Whereas, because of the evacuation of these areas many of the residents have evacuated to areas
that make it impossible for them to report to jury duty;

Now therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2002-58;

It is ordered, that all jury trials through July 5, 2002, have been canceled.

So ordered this 26th day of June 2002.

Presiding Judge



SUPERIOR COURT of the STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Navajo

DIVISION III
GLORIA J. KINDIG
PRESIDING JUDGE

MARLA MYERS
ACTING COURT ADMINISTRATOR

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 2002-022

WHEREAS there is a continuing State of Emergency in Navajo County; and

WHEREAS a large number of Navajo County Probationers have been adversely affected by the current situation either because they have been evacuated or they are unable to go to work since their employment was within the evacuated area; and

WHEREAS a number of Probationers have attempted to continue to comply with their Terms and Conditions of Probation by reporting to the nearest Probation Office or Officer; and

WHEREAS a number of probationers may have a difficult time paying their monthly assessments in a timely manner because of the current situation:

Now, therefore pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2002-58,

IT IS ORDERED that all payments that were due between June 19 through July 31 may be deferred or waived for all Probationers who report in to their supervising officer or the Probation Department and fill out the approved request from for deferral or waiver due to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Probation Department shall file the forms with the Court for review as soon as possible.

Entered this 28th of June, 2002.

Presiding Judge



SUPERIOR COURT of the STATE OF ARIZONA
County of Navajo

DIVISION III
GLORIA J. KINDIG
PRESIDING JUDGE

MARLA MYERS
ACTING COURT
ADMINISTRATOR

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 2002-023

WHEREAS a State of Emergency was declared for Navajo County due to the Rodeo-Chediski fire; and

WHEREAS the Superior Court Calendars for June 20 and 21 were entirely cancelled by Administrative Order No. 2002-007; and

WHEREAS the three Superior Court Divisions have been granting continuances in cases involving parties or counsel located in the evacuated areas; and

WHEREAS some matters were continued without a formal motion and in some cases neither counsel nor parties were present or consulted;

Now, therefore pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2002-58,

IT IS ORDERED that for purposed of Rule 8, in all cases that were continued due to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire, all time between the original setting and the new setting is excluded.

Entered this 28th of June 2002.

Presiding Judge

COURT SECURITY: SELECTED RESOURCES

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<http://www.utoronto.ca/security/drp.htm>

Contingency Planning & Management Online
<http://contingencyplanning.com/>

Contingency Planning World: Disaster Recovery Books & Materials
www.business-continuity-world.com/books.htm

Disaster Preparedness and Response [Conservation Online, a project of the Preservation Department of Stanford University Libraries]

<http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/bytopic/disasters/>

Disaster Recovery Journal's Homepage
<http://www.drj.com/>

Disaster Resources Homepage [University of Illinois Extension]
<http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/%7Edisaster/index.html>

DRI International - Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery Education & Certification
<http://www.drii.org/>

Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN)
<http://www.agctr.lsu.edu/eden/>

Federal Emergency Management Agency
<http://www.fema.gov/>

globalcontinuity.com [registration required]
<http://www.globalcontinuity.com/>

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NCSC Court Security Summit [National Center for State Courts]
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